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Abstract: This article seeks to raise some central questions about the presence of the body in psychoanalytic clinical 
practice and contemporary culture. For such, it examines how this problem appears in the social transformations 
witnessed in the last decades. The biology body and the psychoanalysis body are then compared to emphasize the 
specificity of the latter. This problem refers to the psychoanalytic notion of the drive body, to the limits of psychic 
representation in psychoanalysis, and to the assertion that there is, in this field, a basic indiscernibility between 
the context of the drive and that of representation. In addition to these two aspects, the article highlights the 
importance of including the biological body as one of the dimensions of the metapsychological body in Freud.
Keywords: body, psychoanalysis, psychoanalytic clinic, contemporaneity.
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The objective of this article is to map some 
crucial issues about the body in psychoanalysis and in 
contemporary culture that appear as challenges for the 
current psychoanalytic clinical practice. First of all, 
we must stress that the changes in social regulations 
that have occurred in recent decades caused direct 
resonances and impacts in the subjectivities and 
psychoanalytic practice. Among these transformations, 
the problematic of the body has been highlighted, 
mostly because many contemporary clinical symptoms 
derive from it.
First, we will discuss the effects of these changes 
in the social field, then, we will raise some points that 
we consider critical regarding the psychoanalytic 
clinical practice. The body has been instrumental 
in the creation of the contemporary subjectivity due 
to its predominant role in culture and social ties, 
to the point of being called “somatic personality” 
(Costa, 2005). In other words, the modern individual 
has the construction of his/her identity based on the 
double reference to the body and to self-care. On one 
hand, being attractive, slim and young became the 
morality standard. On the other hand, living for a 
long time and being healthy became imperative, thus, 
the appreciation of the quality of life was inserted in 
the prototypical model of the current identity – the 
bioidentity – transforming self-care into a cult of the 
body, seen as a supreme good. If previous to these 
changes self-care was directed towards the cultivation 
of the soul and of interiority, to the development of 
moral virtues and feelings, nowadays self-care is 
focused on health, beauty, fitness, i.e., to the signs of 
the subjectivity registered more within the exteriority 
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than interiority (Birman, 1999; Costa, 2005; Fernandes, 
2003; Fortes, 2010).
This is problem for a constituted psychoanalysis, 
since its birth, as a form of therapy inserted in the field 
of language and supported, primarily, by registering 
speech. Many authors (Assoun, 2009; Birman, 1999; 
Costa, 2005; Fernandes, 2003; Queiroz, 2008; Winograd, 
2003) have not only shown how much the body 
dimension was historically neglected by psychoanalysis 
– whose modus operandi has contributed to its exclusion 
– but also, in recent times, have sought to manipulate 
that notion more consistently and systematically. The 
old tradition is one of the reasons for this neglect – 
still followed by some parts of the psychoanalytic 
field –, that defines the body as opposed to a psyche 
described commonly as representational. In other 
words, although the Freudian theory consolidated the 
concepts of unconscious and drive and, with it, built 
enough theoretical instruments to discuss and even 
overcome this opposition, psychoanalysis was seen, 
over time, limited to an understanding of the psychic 
processes from the representation and from the signifier. 
In addition, the reduction of the body to its physical 
reference, a characteristic of the hegemonic scientific 
discourse, caused psychoanalysis to reinforce the 
psychophysical dualism of introspective psychology 
from the 19th century. This relationship of distance 
that psychoanalysis maintained with the body led to 
a double movement, according to Fernandes (2003): 
forgotten, the body was absorbed by psychosomatic 
which, however, always emphasized an ill body.
Therefore, discussing the presence of the bodily 
dimension in psychoanalysis is necessary, since the 
traditional psychoanalytic framework usually operates 
from the field of language and betting on a treatment 
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that happens through the word, to the cost of removing 
the body and, as a result, the affection. In the base of 
this problem, multiple reflections arise as propellants of 
important questions for the contemporary psychoanalytic 
clinical practice. The question made in this article is 
how to perform clinical practice with patients that 
make their body – and strictly the body – not only their 
symptom, but their own way of being. In other words, 
from the observation of increasingly severe symptomatic 
formations, configured from the and, above all, in 
the body, we musk question the clinical impact of the 
current cultural imperative of the cult to the body, which, 
quite possibly, intensifies the difficulties of symbolic 
expression of subjects marked by fragile narcissistic 
arrangements.
In this sense, we will now discuss a few points 
that we consider as central to the debate about the place 
of the body in the current psychoanalytic setting. Our 
proposal is not to deepen the issues raised, but to draft a 
mapping that outlines critical and compelling reflections 
nowadays to discuss how the body is considered in 
psychoanalysis.
The place of the body today 
By proposing a clinical question about some effects 
and logical implications of subjectification in the culture, 
we start from the premise that there is a social topicality 
of metapsychology (Douville, 2004). The psychoanalytic 
unconscious is not formed solipsistically, as mentioned 
by Freud when arguing that there is no separation 
between individual psychology and social psychology, 
and also by Lacan, when stressing the transindividual 
character of the unconscious. Therefore, formulating 
key questions is necessary to map the concept of body 
both in contemporary culture and clinic, and to describe 
the scenario that elevated the body as a supreme good.
In the last few decades, a new social cartography 
tied to an unprecedented form of subjectification was 
formed in the Western world, in which the self is 
located in a privileged position (Birman, 1999; Lasch, 
1979; Sibilia, 2008). In fact, the privilege given to the 
self is one of the main characteristics of the so-called 
society of the spectacle (Debord, 1968/1997), which is 
crossed by narcissism (Lasch, 1979). We are facing a 
subjective mode of production that, simultaneously and 
paradoxically, moved from the value given to exteriority 
to being centered in the self (Birman, 1999). In this 
world, marked by the caliber of what appears in and 
what matters to the exterior – and no longer by the 
refinement and enrichment of interiority –, the body 
dimension received prominence as the quintessential 
materialization of the order of exteriority of subjectivity 
parameters.
The reference to this context of the spectacle 
and exteriority marked several interpretations about 
the increase in the number of practices and techniques 
to modify the body, including elective interventions and 
the irreversible manipulation to change the size and the 
format of various body parts, as well as the inscriptions 
with paint or scars to create signs in its surface. For 
example, Birman (2011) understands the culture of 
tattooing as one of the ways young people found to 
express uniqueness, given the invisibility of identity 
in which they find themselves. Similarly, Mielli (2002) 
interpreted body modifications in general as a search 
for landmarks, through which the subject would seek to 
constitute a symbolic territory, an identification trait that 
serves to outline a fluid form. However, if the current 
instability of the body is a condition for the development of 
practices that intend on giving it some sort of identifiable 
mark, we observe that, at the same time, the infinite 
possibilities contained in those same practices reinforce 
the contemporary experience of a mutant and unstable 
body (Mielli, 2002; Orbach, 2009).
Concurrently, although mutant and unstable, 
the body also became the locus of concerns of a 
subject constituted from the imperative of an ideal 
body image, either in its form, according to beauty 
standards, or according to its physiology, following 
the health paradigms. In a world saturated with images 
(Debord, 1968/1997), the body also became a pattern, in 
a way that the desperate search for the ideal image led 
to the impoverishment of the forms of body language 
and of the own concepts of what would be beautiful, 
healthy and normal. In other words, although we have 
witnessed an exacerbation of images, only a few became 
imperatival, leading, paradoxically, to the depreciation 
of body shapes that are different from the established 
models (Orbach, 2009). Although we are witnessing 
some attempts to value bodies that are fat, f laccid, 
defective, old, etc., since very recently, through, for 
example, the proliferation of discourses favoring the 
diversity of patterns in general (aesthetic, gender, etc.) 
and advertising campaigns that capture these groups 
with self-objectives, the respect and appreciation of this 
multiplicity are, to us, still shy. The digital treatment 
of images broadcast in the media so bodies can look 
perfect and so wrinkles are non-existent is still the rule, 
despite the multiplication of reports of the artificiality 
of models constructed like this.
However, these questions on bodily changes and 
on ideal bodies are not the only way to discuss the place 
of the body today. There is also the discussion of the 
so-called cerebral subject (Ehrenberg, 2004/2009), created 
by the neurosciences. Throughout the second half of 
the 20th century, this concept became widely used in 
the field of culture: individuals increasingly believe to 
be, mainly, a product from neurochemical processes. 
The idea of a subject defined and determined by his/her 
neurophysiology is the result from the dominant role 
that biology is occupying in science and in the ideas of 
the 21st century, due to, among other things, advances in 
many fields, such as molecular biology, human genome 
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mapping, cloning and assisted reproduction technologies, 
the production of new medicines, etc. Specifically, the 
evolution of cerebral imaging techniques paired with the 
physicalist interpretation of the images produced, helped 
to construct the belief that comprehending how the brain 
works would be equivalent to understanding the subject 
in its entirety (Ortega, 2008). Concurrently, the data 
produced by the technology to visualize the brain while 
functioning and its correlation with psychic processes led 
to the rearousal of classic discussions and produced an 
important debate – a lot less intense nowadays – between 
neuroscience and psychoanalysis.
Three general axes can be observed in this 
debate. The first comprised the need to compose 
a hybrid field, since neurosciences can offer solid 
fundamentals and methodological instruments 
(scientific) to psychoanalysis to research the psychic 
functioning. That axis was consolidated with the 
creation of neuropsychoanalysis. The second axis 
was completely refractory to any kind of dialogue, 
by understanding that a dialogue was epistemically 
impossible and would inevitably result in the submission 
of psychoanalysis to contemporary science. Finally, 
between these two, the third axis, assuming a strong 
non-reductionist position, defending the theoretical 
and methodological pluralism in the production of 
knowledge about the human psyche and recognized the 
importance of exploring the topic of the body in the 
psychic life, not only the discussions on the conscious 
and unconscious representations of the body, but above 
all, the determinant function in its constitution, in the 
economy and psychic functioning.
The biology body and the 
psychoanalysis body 
Given the dominance of the biological order in 
the contemporary discursive scientific constructions, as 
previously mentioned, we consider relevant to analyze 
which body is discussed in psychoanalysis. For such, 
emphasizing the drive dimension of the body through a 
brief discussion of the role of biology in psychoanalysis 
is necessary. As conceptualized by Freud, we can argue 
that if the body is not to be mixed with the organism 
(biological), the body is also not only defined by its 
symbolic and imaginary inscriptions. For psychoanalysis 
(not only the Freudian), the body is at the intersection 
between the psychic and somatic due to its drive, 
i.e., within the complex and multidimensional game 
between the material (the organic), the immaterial (the 
representational) and a sort of indiscernible blend between 
both (the drive). To circumscribe this problematic and 
create reflections about it, these three records must 
be considered.
When Freud showed that the body revealed by 
hysteria was not the same as the one from anatomy, it 
was because he understood that the hysterical body is 
traversed by the popular language and not by science. 
This difference between the scientific body and the 
popular body, exemplarily evidenced by the hysterical 
conversion symptom, inaugurated the distinction 
between the body from biology and the body from 
psychoanalysis – which was clearly formulated when the 
inventor of psychoanalysis concluded that the hysteria 
behaved as if the anatomy did not exist or as if it did 
not have knowledge of the anatomy. The symbolic 
representation was at stake in hysterical symptoms, 
which were very common at that time, more precisely 
that of the popular language of the organs and the body 
in general. For this reason the paralysis or hysterical 
blindness were not caused by injuries or dysfunction 
of the organs involved, in fact, they were caused by 
representational processes. When considering any 
injury, as Freud claimed in 1893, it would be located 
in the idea of the arm and not on the arm itself (Freud, 
1893/1976). Thus, the hysterical body would be ill by its 
symbolic representation, not by an anatomical or clinical 
injury.  This aspect would only serve to affirm that the 
concept of body in psychoanalysis is broader and more 
complex than the idea of a body-organism, since it is 
also a body-subject that condenses the symbolic and 
imaginary dimensions.
However, if there is no doubt that the invention 
of the unconscious was only possible from the rupture 
with the body anatomical and physiological body from 
medicine, that does not mean that the body in Freud is 
a mere representational figure. In other words, in its 
biological materiality, the body cannot be dismissed 
as one of the determinations of psychic processes. 
However, if this is the case, we must ask: where is 
the place of what is biological in Freudian theory? In 
addition to the logic of representation, would we find 
exclusively the drive dimension, or also the organic 
to which the drive would articulate? To answer these 
questions, we must resume the Freudian notions of 
support and demand for life.
To analyze these two concepts, first, we have to 
differentiate the classical Freudian theory of support and 
the circumscription that the reference to what is organic 
had in Lacanian theory (Lacan, 1955/1985, 1964/1985). 
According to the classical reading of the theory of support 
formulated by Freud (1905/1976) in “Three Essays on the 
Theory of Sexuality”, at first, satisfying the vital needs 
for the maintenance of life and self-preservation would 
occur simultaneously to sexual satisfaction, due to the 
erotic character given to the areas or organs involved in 
the vital needs and to the contact with the object that 
provided the satisfaction. From there, sexual drives 
would become gradually independent of vital needs, 
constantly imposing a search for the repetition of the 
first sexual satisfaction. Thus, if on one hand the support 
represents the resulting relationship from the drive and 
vital functions, which would be their somatic source and 
provide them, initially, a specific direction. On the other 
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hand, it also would stress the gap between the drive and 
the vital functions. In other words, the support would 
represent the primitive and intimate relationship and, at 
the same time, the profound distance between the orders 
of sexuality and of the preservation of life, pointing to the 
relationship of both coincidence and difference between 
self-preservation and sexuality. This is the reason as to 
why this notion is key to understand the drive (sexual) 
conceived as the marginal effect of this support-deviation, 
and as the rupture with the natural order. We also must 
cite the deepening, revision and singular reading of the 
concept of support performed by Laplanche and Pontalis. 
According to Garcia-Roza (1995), the credit for giving 
prominence to this notion must be given to Laplanche, 
who studied it even more deeply than Freud (Garcia-
Roza, 1995, p. 108).
More than 50 years after the formulation of the 
theory of support, Jacques Lacan conceived a different 
perspective from the one proposed by Freud. While 
Freud associated the emergence of sexual drive to an 
organic source corresponding to vital needs, Lacan 
(1964/1985) related the organic reference to demand 
for life that, unlike Freud, would impose the partiality 
and the independence of the drives. For the French 
psychoanalyst, the drive field would not only blend 
itself with the somatic sources in a mythical beginning, 
it would point for a radical non-adaptation of human 
beings. If on the Freudian theory the initial satisfaction 
of the sexual drive derives from the stimulation of the 
oral zone during feeding, we can observe that in Lacan, 
the biological dimension would not involve the provision 
of a specific initial direction.
More than joining the notion of support, the 
circumscription of the biological field in Lacan seeks 
to enhance the understanding of the precariousness 
of the human body. The idea that there is a biological 
prematurity in humans is bound to the fact the imaginary 
needs to be anticipated for the formation of the self as 
a unit (Lacan, 1949/1966). For Lacan, there is a radical 
distance between the organs and their functions, and this 
non-association between both is the condition for the 
emergence of the erogenous body, understood as a partial 
body. The organ can acquire an erogenous function if it 
does not have a determined function (Leclaire, 1979/1992; 
Miller, 1999). This is where the Lacanian critique to the 
idea of support comes from. Sexuality would always be 
taken off the biological, i.e., marked by the inability to 
reach full satisfaction. The Not des Lebens would be the 
demand for general satisfaction, and not the coincidence 
between the drive, its somatic source and, therefore, the 
drive for satisfaction. As Lacan stressed (1964/1985), oral 
satisfaction does not come from the ingestion of food, 
but from the pleasure of what the own mouth is capable 
of. Therefore, the demand for life would not represent 
a reference to specific vital needs, such as nutrition, 
but would express the general need for satisfaction 
through infinitely variable various ways and objects. 
As Assoun (2009) stresses, the Lacanian understanding 
of the biological registration seeks to emphasize the 
importance of partiality for the status of the body in 
psychoanalysis. Considering this understanding, the 
framing would not be given by the notion of support, 
but by the notion of organ pleasure, which links the 
living body and the unconscious life of the organs. The 
organ pleasure was one of the terms used by Freud to 
oppose the idea of a pleasure that would be connected 
to a vital function. As a result from the satisfaction of 
vital needs, the organ pleasure would precisely express 
the size of the bias that comprises what Assoun (2009) 
called “Freudian organology”. From this analysis we can 
understand how important the reference to biology is, 
given that it emphasizes that the excitement permeates 
the organs, characterizing the autoerotic satisfaction of 
partial drives.
However, according to Miller (2000), the sense of 
this importance was updated from the advent of molecular 
biology, which, in his words, supported “Lacan’s thesis 
that the Self will be captured from the signifier and not 
from nature” (p. 10) . To Miller, molecular biology serves 
mainly as a reference for the idea of a fragmented body, 
since it reinforces the idea that the living is originally 
presented in its molecularity, i.e., in its fragmentation. 
This would renew the understanding that the body, as a 
unified instance, is the product from the imaginary order. 
Furthermore, still considering Miller’s understanding, 
articulating the Lacanian notion of living body to the 
concept of jouissance may sustain the presence of 
biology in theory, as it points to a dimension “that is not 
imaginary or symbolic, but living, a body that is affected 
by jouissance” (p. 17).
Regardless, what is common to these possible 
readings about the place of biology in the psychoanalytic 
conception of the body is the idea that the body, through 
its processes, pushes the subject to search for a satisfaction 
that is always partial, that transcends the maintenance 
of life and can only be a unity in the imaginary. From 
the conception of psychoanalysis and although it always 
reinforced the importance of the symbolic covering of 
the body, Freud understood that it cannot be reduced to 
its representational dimension because it is source of 
drives that insistently and constantly pushes the subject, 
undoing and redoing symbolic connections. For this 
reason, Leclaire (1979/1992) was able to state that, 
concurrently and articulately to the symbolic theory, in the 
Freudian theory of sexuality there is also something that 
can be understood as “the capacity of the living body”. 
Abandoning anatomical and physiological conceptions 
of the body did not lead to its elimination: the drive 
body is still the living body, although distinct from the 
anatomical body because it is broader in its capacity to 
respond to drive tensions. In other words, it is a body 
conditioned by a drive pressure that, not only needs to be 
unloaded, it cannot be fully covered by language. There 
is always something left.
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The drive body: the limits of psychic 
representation 
Therefore, the Freudian approach of the body 
involves both the representation and the drive and these 
concepts cannot be separated, since the drive is expressed 
through their representatives, from which, at least one 
is necessarily inserted in the language dimension. From 
this, we can claim the existence of a basic indiscernibility 
between both concepts and a permeability that moves 
towards any dichotomy between representation and drive: 
by definition, the representation is one of the forms of 
expression of the drive. In other words, we must always 
emphasize the intense and driven dimension of language, 
without this, language is dead.
Thus, claiming that drive and representation are 
indistinguishable does not mean that their reasoning are 
absolutely the same. As pointed by David-Ménard (2000), 
if there is a direct relationship between sexual jouissance 
and thought in Freud, the difference between them would 
be in energy levels that each involves. In “Formulations on 
the two principles of mental functioning, Freud (1911/1976) 
showed that there is no opposition between the pursuit of 
pleasure and the act of thinking. While the first would 
relate to the immediate discharge – pleasure principle –, 
the second would result from and operate a delay of this 
discharge in favor of a more effective satisfaction – reality 
principle. Ultimately, both principles seek the discharge 
and satisfaction: enjoyment ( jouissance) and thinking 
would be expressions of the forms of energy distribution 
in the psychic apparatus. Allowing the activity of thought 
would be the postponement of the discharge and pleasure, 
which would not oppose the sexual jouissance or the 
order of the drive body.
Because the living body is jouissance and thought, 
passion and spirit, we can understand how the Freudian 
thought dissolved the Cartesian dualism in which the body 
and the mind would be radically different and would not 
need anything but themselves to exist. Freudian theory, 
contrary to and despite the drive dualities from 1905 
and 1920, is anchored on a drive monism: sexual or of 
self-preservation, of life and death, it is always about the 
same drive body. Moreover, the mere alternation between 
different modes of psychic inscription and materialized 
discharge, be it immediately in and through the body, or 
in its inhibition and postponement, condition that allows 
thought. Thus, what is at stake is how the intensities are 
(or are not) regulated. For this reason, David-Ménard 
(2000) proposes the psyche to be defined as an instrument 
of pleasure-displeasure and anguish and, at the same 
time, as an instrument of thinking that puts into action 
movements that seek to meet the purpose of satisfaction 
and jouissance. In other words, for David-Ménard, if 
“the hysterical body thinks” (p. 17), this occurs due 
to an existing and necessary permeability between the 
body, jouissance and representation, which opposes the 
existence of a dualistic thought in Freud’s works.
This question is important for shedding light 
on the psychoanalytic definition of psyche, which, 
for various reasons throughout its history, referred 
mainly to the role of representations, consequently, 
reinforcing the dominance of the representation and of 
the signifier. However, as we have seen, in addition to 
and as fundamental as the representational dimension, 
the concept of drive appears as the theoretical terrain 
that reveals the substantial indistinction between body 
and psyche in metapsychology. Freud (1915/1976) started 
the essay “Instincts and their vicissitudes” associating 
and, at the same time, differentiating the drive from a 
physiological stimulus, from the reflex arc model. If there 
is no way to escape the incessant pressure exerted by 
the drive – this is the main argument from Freud’s 1915 
essay – it is necessary to seek possible destinations for 
drive excitation. The source of the drive is the somatic 
process, but its destinations involve psychic processes that, 
in turn, necessarily return to the body. Derived from the 
body, the drive returns to it, making it, at the same time, 
the source and the destination. Simultaneously, the body 
is both the drive source and the vehicle that allows the 
discharge that leads to experiencing satisfaction (Andrade, 
2003; Birman, 2009; Winograd & Mendes, 2009).
From 1920, after the formulation of the Freudian 
concept of death drive, the drive dynamics were inscribed 
beyond the pleasure principle, in which the nirvana 
principle would cause the psychic apparatus to try zero 
out all stimulation received. The death drive was defined 
as the cause of psyche impairments and at its limit, of 
the decomposition of the psychic apparatus, thus, in 
opposition, the life drive was responsible to promote the 
link between the internally circulating excitations. Going 
further, when detached from life drive, the death drive 
would trigger movements aspiring total discharge. This 
would occur because the detachment of the drives would 
lead their sudden increase, in an abrupt and traumatic 
movement with an overflow effect of what was not 
captured by the psychic connections (Fortes, 2008).
Simply put, if we believe that the drive is an 
expression of a body never fully covered by representation, 
by reversing the reasoning we can affirm that the drive 
body is the source and the limits of representation, in 
the region before and after the pleasure principle, it is 
the excess drive because it is not linked to and covered 
by representation. The abrupt discharges and violent 
movements of intensification and drainage operate from 
and towards the body. The body that exists now is no 
longer hysterical, symbolic and paradigmatic as it was 
at the beginning of psychoanalysis, it is now an intensive 
and excessive body.
Therefore, there are two dimensions of the 
Freudian approach of the body to Fernandes (2003, 2011): 
the symbolic and the excessive. Between them, there is 
always a tension between what Fernandes (2003, 2011) 
called representation body and drive overflowing body. 
The author proposes that there is a dual existence of the 
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role of the body in Freudian theory, a double rationality 
that indicates that both forms – representational and 
overflowing bodies – reflect the central traits of the 
metapsychological function of the body and offer a fruitful 
way of comprehension of its presence, both in theory 
and in practice.
Similarly, Winograd and Mendes stress that 
to understand which body is being cared for in 
psychoanalysis, we must consider that Freud did not 
address the body only in its symbolic and imaginary 
aspect, but also its biological and drive traits. Additionally, 
for these authors, Freudian theory is not limited to only 
two possible body dimensions, they invite us to consider 
the possibility of the biological body in Freud’s works. 
As already mentioned, we can claim existence of three 
body records for a metapsychology of the body in Freud 
– biological, representational and drive –, considering 
that these records are not isolated, but have impacts and 
reverberations among them.
In this perspective, studying the various aspects 
of the metapsychological body is particularly important 
for us when we propose a general mapping of central 
issues on the subject of body in Freudian theory. The 
idea that there is a double rationality of the place of 
the body in Freudian theory and the emphasis on the 
importance of biology as being equally determinant 
of what occurs within the subject are, to us, essential 
for the purpose of this article, which is, raising some 
points to reflect on the current debate on the topic of 
the body in psychoanalysis.
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this article sought to draw a 
panorama on the place of the body in the current 
psychoanalytic setting, highlighting some areas of 
research and analysis that we consider central for the 
understanding of the current conceptual and clinical 
frame and this problem. In this perspective, we believe 
that discussions on the emphasis that contemporary 
culture gives to the body and the effects of this emphasis 
on psychoanalytic clinical practice must be discussed 
in conjunction with the metapsychological body, which 
was presented here considering its different aspects, 
namely, the records of the drive body, biological body 
and representational body in psychoanalysis. These 
are key conceptual pieces that deserve more study so 
the psychoanalytic understanding about this subject is 
expanded, helping the psychoanalyst in the conflicts and 
challenges posed by the current clinical practice.
Algumas reflexões sobre o corpo no cenário psicanalítico atual
Resumo: Busca-se levantar indagações centrais acerca da presença do corpo na clínica psicanalítica e na cultura contemporânea. 
Para tal finalidade, examina-se o quanto essa problemática participa das transformações sociais testemunhadas nas últimas 
décadas. Em seguida, compara-se o corpo da biologia e o corpo da psicanálise, a fim de enfatizar a especificidade deste 
último. Esse problema remete à noção psicanalítica de corpo pulsional, aos limites da representação psíquica em psicanálise 
e à afirmação de que há nesse campo uma permeabilidade entre o registro da pulsão e o da representação. Além desses dois 
registros, o artigo propõe também incluir o corpo biológico como uma das dimensões do corpo metapsicológico em Freud.
Palavras-chave: corpo, psicanálise, clínica psicanalítica, contemporaneidade.
Quelques réflexions sur le corps dans le scénario psychanalytique actuel
Résumé: On cherche à soulever des questions centrales au sujet de la présence du corps dans la clinique psychanalytique 
et la culture contemporaine. À cet effet, on examine comment cette problématique participe des transformations sociales 
témoignées au cours des dernières décennies. Ensuite on compare le corps de la biologie au corps de la psychanalyse pour 
souligner la spécificité de celui-ci. Ce problème renvoie à la notion psychanalytique du corps pulsionnel, aux limites de la 
représentation psychique en psychanalyse et à l’affirmation selon laquelle il y a dans ce domaine une indiscernabilité basique 
entre le registre de la pulsion et celui de la répresentation. En plus de ces deux dimensions, l’article souligne l’importance 
d’inclure le corps biologique comme l’une des dimensions du corps métapsychologique en Freud. 
Mots-clés: corps, la psychanalyse, la clinique psychanalytique, contemporanéité.
Algunas reflexiones sobre el cuerpo en la escena psicoanalítica actual
Resumen: Se  busca levantar indagaciones centrales sobre la presencia del cuerpo en la clínica psicoanalíitica y en la cultura 
contemporánea. Con este propósito, se examina cuánto esta problemática participa en las transformaciones sociales 
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atestiguadas en las últimas décadas. Enseguida se compara el cuerpo de la biología con el cuerpo del psicoanálisis, a fin de 
enfatizar la especificidad de este último. Este problema se remite a la noción psicoanalítica de cuerpo pulsional, a los límites 
de la representación psíquica en el psicoanálisis y a la afirmación de que hay en este campo una indiscernibilidad básica entre 
el registro de la pulsión y el de la representación Además de estos dos registros, el artículo destaca la importancia de incluir 
también el cuerpo biológico como una de las dimensiones del cuerpo metapsicológico en Freud. Palabras clave: cuerpo, 
psicoanálisis, línica psicoanalítica, contemporaneidade.
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